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This paper tests the existence of precautionary savings using subjective 
or self-reported measures of income uncertainty drawn from Japanese 
household data (primarily from those in their 30s). Two subjective measures
are tested: one concerning labor earnings and the other concerning public 
pension benefits. The results show that, among either nuclear-family 
households or households that do not receive income transfers from parents,
there exist precautionary savings due to uncertainty concerning public 
pension benefits. As the respondents are primarily in their 30s, we find 
that those households start to save based on precautionary motives early 
in their lives. The finding that the effect of public pension uncertainty 
concerning savings is manifested in nuclear-family households suggests 
that intergenerational risk-sharing reduces risk and therefore wealth 
accumulation. Precautionary savings are found to take the form of relatively
low-risk assets; no precautionary savings are found in securities. No evidence
has been found for precautionary savings being motivated by uncertainty
over labor earnings when economic prospects are utilized as the measure of
labor income uncertainty.
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Models of precautionary savings imply that households will hold more assets when
they are faced with greater income uncertainty. Since the late 1980s, many empirical
studies on precautionary savings have been conducted in both the United States and
Europe.
1 In Japan, analyses of precautionary savings using the aggregate time-series
have been conducted by Ogawa (1991), Nakagawa (1999), Doi (2001), and Saito
and Shiratsuka (2003).
2 Their conclusions support the existence of precautionary 
savings; however, primarily due to the lack of available data sources, analyses using
Japanese micro data have thus far been rather limited.
This study uses Japanese micro data to test the existence of precautionary 
savings. As uncertainty measures, subjective or self-reported measures regarding labor
earnings and public pension benefits are applied. The precautionary-saving model is
estimated using the cross-sectional data, while earnings figures from the longitudinal
data are also utilized to derive the permanent income variable in that model.
We find that there is a positive relationship between public pension uncertainty
and wealth accumulation, which supports the theory of precautionary savings for
nuclear-family households and households that do not receive income transfers from
parents.
3 No such relationship is found between households’ asset accumulation and
uncertainty over labor earnings when economic prospects are utilized as the measure
of such uncertainty.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief review of the related
empirical literature on precautionary savings. Section III discusses the model. Section
IV describes the data and the subjective measures of uncertainty. Sections V and VI
present empirical results and some extensions. Section VII offers conclusions and 
discusses some remaining issues.
II. Previous Empirical Studies on Precautionary Savings
Although many empirical studies on precautionary savings have been conducted in the
United States and Europe, they have provided only mixed conclusions. Dardanoni
(1991), using data on British households, found the average consumption across 
occupation and industry groups to be significantly lower when income variance is
greater; he estimates that more than 60 percent of saving is due to precautionary
motives. Carroll and Samwick (1998) used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and found that income risk has positive effects on wealth accumulation, 
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1. Deaton (1992) and Browning and Lusardi (1996) provide reviews of empirical literature. 
2. Ogawa (1991) finds that there is a positive relationship between the saving rate and income uncertainty, using the
variance of income growth expectations computed from a survey of Japanese households. Nakagawa (1999)
applies the same methodology to semi-aggregated data on households by income level, and concludes that precau-
tionary savings tend to be found in low- and middle-income households. Doi (2001) also finds precautionary 
saving behavior based on employment prospects rather than income prospects obtained from the same survey. On
the other hand, Saito and Shiratsuka (2003) investigated precautionary saving as well as “saving as waiting
options,” and find that during the 1990s, saving as waiting options was more dominant in Japan. 
3. In this paper, a nuclear family is defined as a married couple with or without children. If the children live with
their parents, the family is called an extended family.applying proxies for income risks across occupation and education. They further 
conducted simulation studies using the parameters obtained from empirical results,
and found that approximately 50 percent of financial wealth and 45 percent of total
net worth can be attributed to precautionary motives. Kazarosian (1997), using the
National Longitudinal Survey (NLS), applied a similar methodology and concluded
that the financial wealth/permanent income ratio would increase by approximately 
30 percentage points if income risk is doubled. Engen and Gruber (2001), using 
the  Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), found that reducing the 
unemployment-insurance payment benefit replacement rate by 50 percent would
increase gross financial asset holdings by 14 percent for the average worker. 
Dynan (1993), on the other hand, found that the coefficient of relative prudence,
proposed by Kimball (1990), is not statistically different from zero in the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX), suggesting that there is no precautionary saving. Guiso 
et al. (1992), using individual data on Italian households, found that consumption 
is only slightly lower and wealth accumulation only slightly higher (approximately 
2 percent of total net worth) for households indicating a greater subjective variance 
for their next year’s earnings. Lusardi (1998), using the Health Retirement Survey
(HRS), the respondents for which are 51–61 years of age, found precautionary wealth
accumulation to be small (2–4.5 percent in financial wealth and 1–3.5 percent in total
net worth), applying a subjective next year’s income risk, which is calculated by income
multiplied by the subjective possibility of job loss during the next year. Starr-McCluer
(1996) focused on uncertainty related to spending in medical service, rather than 
earnings; she found no evidence that wealth accumulation is lower for health-insured
households in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
There has been little empirical research on precautionary savings using Japanese
micro data. Zhou (2003) applied the methodology of Dardanoni (1991) to the 1996
Financial Asset Choice of Households, published by the Ministry of Public
Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications. She found that 
consumption is significantly lower when income variance is greater; the result 
implies that 5.6 percent of total saving is due to precautionary motives for salaried-
worker households, while such motive accounts for 64.3 percent of total saving for
agricultural, forestry, fishery, or self-employed households. Horioka et al. (2002),
using the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC) conducted by the Institute 
for Research on Household Economics (IRHE), noted the possibility of the existence
of precautionary saving, referring to the fact that households which have experienced
unforeseen contingencies such as unemployment, bankruptcy, or traffic accidents
reduce their savings. 
Shimizutani (2002), on the other hand, in accordance with Dynan (1993), found
that the coefficient of relative prudence is not significantly different from zero
through 1995–97, although it is positive and significant in 1998 in the Household
Savings Survey conducted by the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs,
Posts and Telecommunications.
A central difficulty in empirical analyses of precautionary savings is how to obtain
a good measure of individual risk. As discussed by Browning and Lusardi (1996), it
should be observable, exogenous, and vary significantly across the population.
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of risk, such as measurement errors, implying that direct measures of subjective 
measures are more attractive if questionnaires are fully understandable for respondents
and replied to accurately.
This research tests the existence of precautionary savings using subjective measures
of income uncertainty drawn from the JPSC. To measure individual risk, two dummy
variables are used: one concerning labor earnings and the other concerning public 
pension benefits. The questions are simple and straightforward, avoiding the problem
of questions being misunderstood by respondents, as stressed by Browning and 
Lusardi (1996). The uncertainty of public pension benefits is examined, as public 
pension benefits play an important role, representing approximately 80 percent of
income,
4among retired households, and because approximately 80 percent of young or
middle-aged households worry about their public pension benefits in Japan. These facts
raise the question of whether uncertainty over public pension benefits affects the 
saving behavior of Japanese households. Higo et al. (2001) indicated the existence 
of precautionary savings due to uncertainty concerning public pensions, without 
offering direct empirical evidence. 
III. Empirical Model
The theory of precautionary saving specifies that households facing uncertainty save
more if the third derivative of the utility function is positive (Leland [1968] and
Sandmo [1970]). One problem with this framework is that it is generally impossible
to obtain closed-form solutions.
5 We therefore estimate a reduced-form wealth/
permanent-income equation based on the life-cycle permanent income model, which
has been used by many authors including Engen and Gruber (2001), Lusardi (1998),
Kazarosian (1997), Starr-McCluer (1996), and Guiso et al. (1992): 
Wi —– = f (agei,  i, Xi). (1)
Yi
p
Wi is wealth held by the household i; Yi
p is the permanent non-property disposable
income (hereinafter referred to as permanent income); agei is the age of the head of
the household;  i is the uncertainty measure for future income; Xi is the variable 
vector representing the household characteristics affecting utility. If preference is 
not homothetic, Xi includes Yi
p (King and Dicks-Mireaux [1982]). Note that there 
is a positive relationship between uncertainty and wealth, in accordance with the 
precautionary-saving model.
24 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2003
4. According to the 1996 Family Income and Expenditure Survey published by the Ministry of Public Management,
Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, among households with household heads aged over 59 and retired,
approximately 80 percent of income is from public pension benefits. The remaining 20 percent is primarily from
labor earnings of other household members. In addition, they dissave their financial assets, which correspond to
only approximately 10 percent of their income.
5. See the theoretical review of precautionary savings in Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Deaton (1992).IV. Data and Subjective Measures of Uncertainty
A. Data
The JPSC covered 1,500 single and married women aged 24–34 in 1993, when it
was first conducted. The sample was selected on the basis of a stratified two-stage
random sampling method throughout the country. Respondents have been followed
up regularly in October of each year since then, and six-year panels (1993–98) are
currently available (upon application to the IRHE). The survey contains major 
economic series such as consumption, saving, annual income, wealth, and a series of
demographic and economic characteristics including age, martial status, employment
conditions, education, and number of children. Although males are excluded from
the survey population, the survey does include the information on the husband of
females in the sample who are married. 
It should be noted that, as the survey is conducted using young or middle-aged
women, this paper focuses primarily on the behavior of younger and middle-aged
households, and excludes the elderly.
Table 1 indicates the sample characteristics used in equation (3), which is 
discussed in Section V. We deleted the sample respondents with missing values for
regression, and obtained 784 observations in the 1996 JPSC. In the process of 
estimating permanent income, we exclude single respondents, respondents (wives)
who work full-time, and respondents who earn more than ¥1 million per year. We
also exclude households in which husbands are either agricultural workers or 
25
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Table 1  Descriptive Statistics
Variables Number of  Average Standard  Minimum Maximum observations deviation
Husband’s age 279 35.1 4.6 23 45
Wife’s age 279 32.5 3.1 27 37
Age difference between husband  279 2.6 3.4 –7 17 and wife
Wife’s education  279 12.9 1.7 9 16 (translated into years)
Number of children 279 1.85 0.87 0 5
Owner-occupier dummy 279 0.48 0.50 0 1
Extended-family dummy 279 0.23 0.42 0 1
Permanent income (real, million yen) 279 5.06 1.73 1.45 12.67
Financial assets/permanent income 279 1.11 0.89 0 5.6
Deposits/permanent income 279 0.59 0.68 0 4.8
Personal insurance (savings-type)/ 279 0.47 0.41 0 2.5 permanent income
Securities/permanent income 279 0.05 0.23 0 3.2
Total net worth/permanent income 254 1.46 2.14 –2.4 13.8
Notes: 1. For the owner-occupier dummy, owned house = 1 and others = 0. For the extended-family
dummy, living with parents = 1 and others = 0.
2. Personal insurance (savings-type) indicates the total premiums paid thus far for savings-type
policies (postal insurance, postal annuity pensions, life insurance, personal pension 
insurance, reserve-type liability insurance, etc.).self-employed, as well as those in which the husband and/or wife obtains income
from his or her own business.
6 The remaining samples contain few households with
heads over 45 years of age, which are accordingly excluded (six observations). Finally,
those holding an extreme amount of wealth are dropped (three observations),
7 leaving
us with 279 observations to regress the model. 
The average age of wives is 32.5 years, while that of husbands is 35.1 years, as
shown in Table 1. Education is translated into years in school: junior high school
graduate = 9 years; senior high school graduate = 12 years; technical or junior college
graduate = 14 years; and university/graduate school graduate = 16 years. Incomes and
assets are deflated by the household consumption expenditure deflator obtained from
the System of National Accounts published by the Cabinet Office (for assets, the
third-quarter seasonally adjusted figure is used). Average permanent income is 
estimated at ¥5.06 million. The average financial asset/permanent income ratio is
1.11, with financial assets including deposits, securities, and total premium payments
already made for the funding of insurance policies, which exclude term insurance
without maturity refund.
8
In addition to the figures given in Table 1, the average annual income before 
tax (earned in the previous year) and financial assets are ¥5.86 million and ¥5.89 
million, respectively (both nominal). In comparison, according to the Family Savings
Survey (for 1995 and 1996) published by the Ministry of Public Management, Home
Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, workers’ households in which the heads are
30–34 years of age hold ¥6.68 million in financial assets and earn ¥5.97 million
(¥5.84 million in the 1995 survey); the figures are ¥9.16 million and ¥6.94 million
(¥6.58 million in the 1995 survey), respectively, for households in which the heads
are 35–39 years of age. Both financial assets and annual incomes in the households
covered by our analyses are slightly lower than those in the Family Savings Survey.
9
B. Subjective Measures of Uncertainty
In estimating equation (1), a major problem is what should be chosen as the 
uncertainty measures. Many previous studies use some proxies for income uncertainty,
such as income variance. However, as the JPSC currently provides only a six-year panel,
it is difficult to formulate proxies for income uncertainty by computing income 
variance.
10 In addition, the JPSC asks no direct question concerning households’
income uncertainty, such as the probability distribution of their labor earnings or the
probability of losing their jobs. Fortunately, however, related to income uncertainty, 
the JPSC asked a question concerning economic prospects in the second panel (1994)
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6. See Appendix 1 for the procedure used in constructing a measure of permanent income. 
7. The asset/permanent income ratio is regressed by age and age-squared. Observations for which the equation
residuals are four times larger or smaller than the equation standard errors are eliminated (three samples). 
8. Appendix 2 explains the definitions of each asset. 
9. One possible reason for the discrepancies is that we have eliminated households in which wives work full-time or
earn more than ¥1 million per year. The JPSC itself reported the following characteristics of respondents to the
survey: (1) there are slightly more couples who live with their parents; (2) there are slightly fewer couples who
have no children; (3) the educational background is relatively higher; and (4) household incomes are slightly
lower (Institute for Research on Household Economics [1995]).
10. Among the samples used for the estimation of permanent income (2,622 observations, 683 households; see
Appendix 1), those in which income data is available for all six years are limited to 149 households (894 samples).and one concerning the uncertainty of public pension benefits in the fourth panel
(1996); those we employ in the regression model.
The question regarding economic prospects is “Do you think that Japan’s business
conditions will be better in the near future?” Each respondent selected her response






As companies or enterprises normally take into account their current and future
revenues in determining employees’ wages, households’ economic prospects could
generally affect the probability distribution of their expected labor earnings. We
assume that the uncertainty over labor earnings for the next year for respondents who
selected “no change” is lower than that of those who replied “worse” or “better,” all
other factors being equal. 
Table 2 shows that those who responded “slightly better” and “no change” each
account for approximately 40 percent, and that approximately 15 percent of the
respondents anticipated that the situation would be “slightly worse.” As annual incomes
rise, as wives’ education levels increase, or as the number of children decreases, the 
percentage of those anticipating that the situation would be “better” increases. The 
percentage is also higher for those in which wives (respondents) work compared to
those in which wives do not.
The question concerning uncertainty regarding public pension benefits is “Do
you think the public pension system is a reliable economic resource for your life after
retirement?” The response was selected from among the following:
1. Relying on a public pension, as the public pension will be the primary source
of personal income
2. Wish to rely on a public pension, but worried that the amount currently
expected is unlikely to be fulfilled
3. Feel uneasy, as the public pension system itself may become unsustainable due
to the rapidly aging society
4. Not relying on a public pension
5. Other (please specify)
One could reasonably assume that the respondents who selected replies 2 or 3
would evaluate the uncertainty of future public pension benefits more cautiously or
pessimistically than those who selected reply 1. This reasoning suggests an empirically
testable implication for our reduced-form model equation (1).
11
The ratio of those who selected reply 1 is 12.8 percent (Table 3). Almost 80 percent
of all respondents indicated that they have some misgivings concerning the public 
pension system, including 38.5 percent who indicated concern about the decrease 
in pension benefits and 40.9 percent who indicated concern about the sustainability 
of the system itself. The ratio of those who do not rely on a pension is 7.9 percent. 
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11. One potential problem with this specification is that it assumes the expected value of future public pension 
benefits to be independent of its uncertainty. This problem will be tested in Section VI.28 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2003




All samples 728 0.5 41.6 40.9 14.7 2.2 100
Age group
25–27 161 0.6 44.1 37.3 15.5 2.5 100
28–32 345 0.9 44.6 40.9 12.8 0.9 100
33–35 222 0.0 35.1 43.7 17.1 4.1 100
Education
Junior high school graduate 50 0.0 20.0 60.0 12.0 8.0 100
Senior high school graduate 346 0.6 40.5 41.0 16.2 1.7 100
Technical/junior college graduate 266 0.8 45.5 37.6 14.3 1.9 100
University/graduate school graduate 66 0.0 48.5 39.4 10.6 1.5 100
Number of workers
One 422 0.9 44.3 39.6 12.6 2.6 100
Two 306 0.0 37.9 42.8 17.6 1.6 100
Whether wife works full-time
Full-time 148 0.0 35.8 43.2 18.9 2.0 100
Part-time 129 0.0 41.1 41.1 16.3 1.6 100
Husband’s age
Younger than 30 72 1.4 44.4 37.5 15.3 1.4 100
30–34 248 0.4 48.8 39.1 10.9 0.8 100
35–39 252 0.4 38.1 42.9 16.3 2.4 100
40–44 124 0.8 32.3 43.5 18.5 4.8 100
45 or older 32 0.0 43.8 37.5 15.6 3.1 100
Annual income
Less than ¥4 million 28 0.0 25.0 42.9 21.4 10.7 100
¥4 million ≤ income < ¥6 million 270 1.1 41.9 40.0 14.8 2.2 100
¥6 million ≤ income < ¥8 million 264 0.0 41.7 40.5 15.9 1.9 100
¥8 million ≤ income < ¥10 million 111 0.9 43.2 41.4 13.5 0.9 100
¥10 million or more 55 0.0 45.5 45.5 7.3 1.8 100
Number of children
None 102 0.0 50.0 42.2 5.9 2.0 100
One 212 0.5 46.7 38.7 12.3 1.9 100
Two 315 1.0 37.8 41.3 18.1 1.9 100
Three 88 0.0 36.4 42.0 17.0 4.5 100
Four or more 11 0.0 18.2 54.5 27.3 0.0 100
Privately owned house or not
Privately owned house 373 0.3 41.8 41.8 14.2 1.9 100
Rented house 355 0.8 41.4 40.0 15.2 2.5 100
Living with parents or not
Living with parents 260 1.2 39.2 40.8 16.9 1.9 100
Not living with parents 468 0.2 42.9 41.0 13.5 2.4 100
Note: Excluding single households and those in which husbands are farmers or self-employed.29
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Table 3  Uncertainty over Future Public Pensions
Percent
Number of  
observations 1234 Total
All samples 736 12.8 38.5 40.9 7.9 100
Age group
27–29 183 9.8 42.6 39.3 8.2 100
30–34 345 13.9 35.9 40.9 9.3 100
35–37 208 13.5 38.9 42.3 5.3 100
Education
Junior high school graduate 44 22.7 25.0 25.0 27.3 100
Senior high school graduate 325 14.5 40.3 39.1 6.2 100
Technical/junior college graduate 280 10.4 39.6 43.9 6.1 100
University/graduate school graduate 87 9.2 34.5 46.0 10.3 100
Number of workers
One 394 12.2 38.8 40.6 8.4 100
Two 342 13.5 38.0 41.2 7.3 100
Whether wife works full-time
Full-time 149 14.1 38.3 40.9 6.7 100
Part-time 165 13.9 35.2 41.8 9.1 100
Husband’s age
Younger than 30 99 8.1 33.3 45.5 13.1 100
30–34 251 11.6 36.7 43.0 8.8 100
35–39 251 12.7 40.2 40.2 6.8 100
40–44 109 18.3 42.2 35.8 3.7 100
45 or older 26 19.2 42.3 30.8 7.7 100
Annual income
Less than ¥4 million 104 14.4 28.8 47.1 9.6 100
¥4 million ≤ income < ¥6 million 277 11.2 41.5 37.9 9.4 100
¥6 million ≤ income < ¥8 million 222 14.4 35.6 44.1 5.9 100
¥8 million ≤ income < ¥10 million  84 13.1 42.9 39.3 4.8 100
¥10 million or more 49 10.2 46.9 32.7 10.2 100
Number of children
None 93 10.8 38.7 41.9 8.6 100
One 178 9.0 32.6 46.1 12.4 100
Two 334 13.2 39.8 39.8 7.2 100
Three 120 17.5 41.7 38.3 2.5 100
Four or more 11 27.3 54.5 9.1 9.1 100
Privately owned house or not
Privately owned house 402 12.9 40.0 40.3 6.7 100
Rented house 334 12.6 36.5 41.6 9.3 100
Living with parents or not
Living with parents 257 13.6 38.1 40.5 7.8 100
Not living with parents 479 12.3 38.6 41.1 7.9 100
Note: As in Table 2.The higher the wife’s education level and the younger the husband, the higher the 
percentage of respondents indicating stronger uncertainty regarding pensions. The ages
of respondents and wives’ working status makes no significant difference.
V. Empirical Results 
Prior to the regression, probit estimations are conducted to examine possible factors
that may be correlated with both wealth accumulation and uncertainty measures;
those variables should be included in the model, as the obtained parameters will 
otherwise be biased. Some variables are found to be correlated with both the
wealth/permanent-income ratio and future uncertainty: for economic prospects,
wives’ education, double- or single-income household dummy, current income, 
and number of children; for uncertainty regarding public pension benefits, wives’
education, number of children, and age differences between husbands and wives (see
Appendix 3 for more details). Thus, based on equation (1), the following equations
(2) and (3) have been estimated, including the above factors as explanatory variables.
Wi —–   = a0 + a11FDUM1i + a12FDUM2i Yi
p
+ a2Yi
p + a31Agei + a32Agei
2 + a4Fedui + a5Childreni
+ a6Nemi + a7Incomei + ei. (2)
Wi —–   = a′ 0 + a′ 11IDUM2i + a′ 12IDUM3i + a′ 13IDUM4i Yi
p
+ a′ 2Yi
p + a′ 31Agei + a′ 32Agei
2 + a′ 4Fedui + a′ 5Childreni
+ a′ 6Agap + e′ i. (3)
The variables are defined as follows.
W: Wealth 
FDUM1: Reply to economic prospects = 1 for 1 or 2, and 0 dummy for the others
FDUM2: Reply to economic prospects = 1 for 4 or 5, and 0 dummy for the others
IDUM2:  Reply to uncertainty regarding public pensions = 1 for 2, and 0
dummy for the others
IDUM3:  Reply to uncertainty regarding public pensions = 1 for 3, and 0
dummy for the others
IDUM4:  Reply to uncertainty regarding public pensions = 1 for 4, and 0
dummy for the others
Y
p: Permanent income
Age: Age of husband
Fedu: Educational background of wife (respondent)
Children: Number of children
Nem: Double income = 1; 0 dummy for the others
Income: Annual income for the previous year
Agap: Age difference between husband and wife (husband’s age – wife’s age)
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p, is estimated using longitudinal data from the JPSC (see
Appendix 1). 
The theory demonstrates that households with a utility function, for which the
third derivative is positive, consume less in the current period if they are uncertain
about their prospects for future income. Therefore, parameters a11, a12, a′ 11, a′ 12 are
expected to satisfy the following conditions:
a11 > 0, a12 > 0  
a′ 11 > 0, a′ 12 > 0. (4) 
Furthermore, precautionary saving effects against the uncertainty over future public
pension benefits would not exceed the amount of life-cycle savings supplementarily
accumulated by respondents who are not dependent on a public pension:
max(a′ 11, a′ 12) ≤ a′ 13. (5)
In accordance with the age effects, if we assume a finite model, the wealth/age
profile becomes hump-shaped. As this study covers households with heads under 45
years of age, the age effects are expected to be positive:
a31 + 2 a32age > 0 
a′ 31 + 2 a′ 32age > 0. (6)
Table 4 highlights the results. Neither dummy of those who responded that 
business conditions would be “better” nor “worse” is statistically significant at all.
12
As for uncertainty regarding public pension benefits, the p-value becomes closer to 
zero but not statistically significant either. However, when extended-family (three-
generation) households are excluded, the dummies for pension uncertainty become 
significant. Those with misgivings regarding public pensions possess more financial
assets, by approximately 40 percentage points in terms of the permanent-income 
ratio, compared with those who selected reply 1. This result implies that, among
nuclear-family households, households with uncertainty concerning public pensions 
accumulate more financial assets by approximately ¥2.1 million, which corresponds 
to approximately one-third of the average financial assets held.
13 There is no difference
in the effects between “uncertainty about reduced pension benefits” (reply 2) and
“uncertainty about the system” (reply 3). 
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12. The results do not change even if extended families are excluded (the p-value of the dummy of those who
responded “worse” was 0.277; the number of observations for the equation was 228).
13. The average permanent income and financial wealth for the sample reported in Table 5 [2] are ¥5.069 million
and ¥5.849 million, respectively. The estimated parameters may be underestimated due to the exclusion of
expected pension benefits from permanent income.More detailed results for uncertainty regarding public pensions are given in 
Table 5 [1], together with the results for total net worth. The pension uncertainty
dummy is not significant for the total net worth, even when extended-family house-
holds are excluded. This is probably due to the fact that, in Japan, where physical
assets such as housing and land are commonly owned not for investment but for 
living purposes, it is more rational to accumulate financial assets for future living
expenses as a precautionary behavior. 
In Table 5 [2], financial wealth is divided into three categories: deposits, the 
accumulated amount for personal insurance, and securities. Public pension uncertainty
dummies have no effects on securities. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients
show positive values both in deposits and in the accumulated amount for personal
insurance. Although neither is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, the 
coefficient becomes highly significant if those assets are aggregated. Thus, households
accumulate more wealth in deposits and/or personal insurance for precautionary
motives, but not in securities. 
Those who responded “not relying on pension” (reply 4) have more financial
assets by approximately 70 percentage points in terms of the permanent-income
ratio, compared to those depending on public pensions, although the p-value of 
the coefficient is marginally lower than the 5 percent level. This broadly confirms
that public pensions and life-cycle savings are substituted for each other (equation 
[5] holds). 
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FDUM1 –0.028 (0.101) 0.785




IDUM2 0.202 (0.139) 0.147
IDUM3 0.254 (0.149) 0.088
IDUM4 0.299 (0.286) 0.297
(2) Nuclear families
IDUM2 0.394 (0.144) 0.007
IDUM3 0.381 (0.152) 0.013
IDUM4 0.695 (0.357) 0.053
Note: The estimation method is OLS. For economic prospects, those who responded “no change” 
are regarded as standard. The number of observations on the equation is 296. For uncertainty
concerning public pensions, those who responded “relying” are regarded as standard. The 
number of observations for all samples and for nuclear families is 296 and 228, respectively.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Economic prospects 
were surveyed in 1994. Uncertainty over public pensions was surveyed in 1996. For 
more detailed estimation results for the latter, refer to Table 5.The age effect in financial wealth excluding securities is found to be positive for
nuclear families and therefore consistent with equation (6).
One possible reason for the effect of uncertainty regarding pensions being 
significant only for nuclear families is that intergenerational risk-sharing reduces the
effect of precautionary savings. To investigate this problem, we further regress the
model by dividing the observations into two groups according to whether they
receive any income transfer from parents, the response to which is available from the
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Table 5  Uncertainty over Public Pension Benefits and Wealth Accumulation
[1] Financial Wealth and Total Net Worth
Financial assets Total net worth
All samples Nuclear families All samples Nuclear families
IDUM2 0.202 (0.139) 0.394 (0.144)*** –0.603 (0.668) –0.040 (0.665)
IDUM3 0.254 (0.149)* 0.381 (0.152)** –1.092 (0.639) –0.668 (0.626)
IDUM4 0.299 (0.286) 0.695 (0.357)* 0.119 (0.943) 0.309 (0.991)
Age –0.039 (0.133) –0.208 (0.172) –0.485 (0.367) –0.639 (0.533)
Age
2 0.002 (0.002) 0.005 (0.003)* 0.009 (0.006) 0.011 (0.008)
Y
p 0.006 (0.028) 0.019 (0.032) 0.041 (0.073) 0.084 (0.081)
Fedu 0.117 (0.033)*** 0.124 (0.035)*** 0.196 (0.072)*** 0.221 (0.077)***
Children –0.125 (0.064)* –0.142 (0.071)** –0.253 (0.183) –0.276 (0.202)
Agap –0.051 (0.020)** –0.066 (0.023)*** –0.039 (0.074) –0.016 (0.086)
Constant –1.036 (2.141) 1.112 (2.773) 5.577 (5.896) 7.080 (8.492)
Number of  279 214 254 203 observations
[2] Deposits, Personal Insurance, and Securities (Nuclear Families)
Deposits Personal insurance  Securities Financial assets 
(Tobit) (Tobit) excluding securities
IDUM2 0.187 (0.114) 0.220 (0.113)* 0.155 (0.330) 0.358 (0.135)***
IDUM3 0.212 (0.114)* 0.194 (0.113)* –0.084 (0.333) 0.383 (0.144)***
IDUM4 0.528 (0.264)** 0.050 (0.162) 0.265 (0.478) 0.597 (0.306)*
Age –0.291 (0.155) 0.101 (0.084) 0.378 (0.300) –0.227 (0.154)
Age
2 0.005 (0.002)** –0.001 (0.001) –0.005 (0.004) 0.005 (0.002)**
Y
p 0.036 (0.027) –0.026 (0.019) 0.144 (0.057)** 0.004 (0.030)
Fedu 0.093 (0.029)*** 0.019 (0.019) 0.156 (0.065)** 0.105 (0.031)***
Children –0.125 (0.052)** –0.020 (0.039) –0.020 (0.118) –0.134 (0.066)**
Agap –0.033 (0.020) –0.038 (0.014)*** –0.040 (0.044) –0.065 (0.023)***
Constant 3.178 (2.365) –2.297 (1.443) –10.465 (5.500)* 1.730 (2.488)
Number of  214 214 214 214 observations
Log likelihood –137.1 –85.55
Notes: 1. The estimation method is OLS or otherwise shown in the table. Heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance 
of independent variables, at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
2. Personal insurance indicates the total premiums paid thus far for savings-type policies
(postal insurance, postal annuity pensions, life insurance, personal pension insurance,
reserve-type liability insurance, etc.).
3. Financial assets = deposits + personal insurance + securities.JPSC.
14 The results are given in Table 6. Among households that do not receive
income transfers from parents, the effect of uncertainty regarding pensions is 
significant; however, among those that do receive such income transfers, the effect is
insignificant. The coefficients of public pension uncertainty dummies are approxi-
mately 30 percent among the former, implying that households with uncertainties
concerning public pensions accumulate more wealth by ¥1.5 million (approximately
one-fourth of financial wealth held). 
The other possible reason is the “demonstration effect” proposed by Stark (1995).
Stark’s model assumes that children simply imitate their parents’ actions with a certain
probability, and that parents are aware that their own children may be imitators. In this
model, the higher the probability of imitation, the more “productive” the transfers to
one’s parents. The children must be close to their parents so that they can imitate their
parents’ behaviors. Thus, if parents live with grandparents, the possibility of their 
children living with them in the future increases, as does the possibility of them 
making some transfers to their parents as their parents did for their grandparents. 
If Stark’s model can be applied to Japanese households, households who live with their
parents might anticipate co-residence with their children in the future, which has the
effect of reducing their current precautionary savings. 
Lastly, the possible reasons for the effects of economic prospects on wealth not
being significant are as follows. First, our analyses are based on the hypothesis, as
mentioned earlier, that respondents replying that the economic prospects would be
“better” or “worse” recognize a larger risk in labor earnings than those who responded
that there would be “no change.” It is likely, however, that a substantial number of
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14. Households that receive economic transfers from parents are those that responded “yes” to the question con-
cerning whether they receive any funds for the repayment of housing loans, rent, living expenses, or the like 
from either set of parents. Those that responded “no” are designated as households that do not receive economic
transfers from parents.
Table 6  Uncertainty over Public Pension Benefits and Wealth Accumulation
(Comparison Based on Whether Economic Transfers Are Received 
from Parents)
Financial assets
With transfers Without transfers
IDUM2 –0.358 (0.438) 0.290 (0.143)**
IDUM3 –0.290 (0.481) 0.317 (0.150)**
IDUM4 –0.762 (0.467) 0.555 (0.337)
Age 0.313 (0.185)* –0.156 (0.156)
Age
2 –0.004 (0.003) 0.003 (0.002)
Y
p –0.065 (0.096) 0.023 (0.029)
Fedu 0.067 (0.053) 0.126 (0.036)***
Children –0.139 (0.127) –0.137 (0.075)*
Agap –0.032 (0.042) –0.054 (0.024)**
Constant –5.029 (3.260) 0.507 (2.549)
Number of observations 67 212
Note: As in Table 5.households recognize only limited effects of the deteriorating economic conditions
on their own labor earnings, particularly in consideration of the fact that the survey
was conducted in 1994, when the stagnant economic conditions in Japan were not
perceived to be as severe as they are today. Second, if the economic prospects are 
recognized as transitory and thus not affecting uncertainty regarding permanent
income, the effects on precautionary savings may become too weak to allow sufficient
verification. Third, it is also possible that the economic prospects accurately indicate
income uncertainty, and that the results therefore indicate no precautionary savings
due to uncertainty over labor earnings. 
To investigate the above possible causes, it is worthwhile to refer to another 
survey. According to The Bank’s Opinion Survey on Lifestyle and Financial Behavior,
No. 2, published by the Bank of Japan in 1994, the ratio that replied that business
conditions were “bad” or “fairly bad” amounted to 86.6 percent in 1994 (Table 7).
As for the next year’s business conditions, the ratio that replied “worse” or “slightly
worse” was 16.9 percent, while that for “no change” was 55.8 percent. Regarding the
average economic growth rate in the coming five to 10 years, more than 70 percent
of respondents replied that the Japanese economy growth rate would continue to be
low, including 21.6 percent of those who expected the growth rate to be possibly 
negative. As for their own income, on the other hand, 33.5 percent of respondents
replied that their income had decreased compared to the previous year in 1994.
However, only 21.2 percent expected their income to fall the next year. Concerning
their income in the coming five to 10 years, 41.5 percent of those expected 
their income to increase, while 26.7 percent expected their income to decrease.
Meanwhile, the inflation rate was expected to be no more than 1–3 percent by
approximately 70 percent of respondents for the next year, as well as for the coming
five to 10 years.
It should be noted that this survey does not ask questions concerning income
uncertainty, but does ask questions concerning income growth. Furthermore, the
income prospects do not exclude the effect of deterministic factors, including age
effects. Thus, as the next step, we compare equation residuals and their variance
obtained from equation (A.4) in Appendix 1 for each reply to the economic
prospects (Table 8). The variance tends to be marginally higher for respondents who
selected “better” or “worse,” compared to those who selected “no change” in 1994.
However, in the following year it reverses, and there is no clear relationship between
the variance and the economic prospects. 
Thus, the reason that the economic-prospect dummies are not significant is that
there may have been little relationship between income uncertainty and economic
prospects, rather than because there are no precautionary-saving motives. 
VI. Precautionary Savings or Life-Cycle Savings?
The results given in the previous section imply that one-third of financial wealth can
be attributed to uncertainty over future pensions among nuclear-family households.
In the previous section, we assumed that uncertainty over public pension benefits is
35
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Table 7  Assessments of Business Conditions, Income, and Prices
Percent
Economic prospects (business conditions)
Good Fairly good Normal Fairly bad Bad
Current situation 0.3 1.7 11.4 39.7 46.9
Better Slightly  No change Slightly Worse
better worse
Next year 1.1 26.1 55.8 11.2 5.7
High Low Low, possibly No idea
negative
Average economic growth 3.5 50.7 21.6 24.2
rate for the next 5–10 years
Income
Increased Increased No change Decreased Decreased
slightly slightly
Change from last year 2.2 17.8 46.3 18.9 14.6
Increase Increase No change Decrease Decrease No idea
slightly slightly
Next year 1.7 20.7 56.3 13.2 8.0 —
For the next 5–10 years 7.3 34.2 24.8 13.2 13.5 6.8
Prices
Fall Fall Fall Almost Rise Rise Rise
7 percent–  4–6 1–3  the same 1–3 4–6  7 percent– 
percent percent percent percent
Change from last year 3.6 2.9 5.3 28.9 29.3 19.3 10.3
Next year 1.6 1.1 2.8 30.6 35.1 17.1 11.3
Average inflation rate for 1.7 1.1 4.1 15.1 47.8 20.4 9.0
the next 5–10 years
Notes: 1. The figures are obtained from The Results of the Bank’s Opinion Survey on Lifestyle and Financial
Behavior, No. 2, published by the Bank of Japan. The survey covered 3,407 respondents among a total 
of 4,000 representative consumers from across the nation who were older than 19 years of age.
2. Concerning economic prospects, the questions were “What is your assessment of current business 
conditions?” and “What is your assessment of the prospects for business conditions next year?” As 
for the growth rate for the next 5–10 years, the question was “What do you expect the overall average 
economic growth rate of the Japanese economy to be over the next 5–10 years?” Respondents selected 
a reply from among the following:
“1. Will be a high growth rate as in the past.”
“2. Will continue to be low.” 
“3. Will continue to be low, and possibly negative.”
“4. No idea.”
3. As for income, the questions were “Has your (and your spouse’s) income increased or decreased since
last year?” and “What do you expect your (and your spouse’s) income to be next year?” As for the
income for the next 5–10 years, the question was “What do you expect your (and your spouse’s) income
to be over the next 5–10 years?” Respondents selected a reply from among the following:
“1. Will increase compared to income this year.” 
“2. Will increase slightly compared to income this year.” 
“3. No change.” 
“4. Will decrease slightly compared to income this year.” 
“5. Will decrease compared to income this year.”
“6. No idea.”
4. As for prices, the questions were “What is your assessment of the price level compared to last year?” and
“What do you expect the price level to be next year compared to this year?” As for the price for the next
5–10 years, the question was “What do you think the average inflation rate will be over the next 5–10
years in Japan?”independent of the expected value of households’ public pension benefits. If there is a
correlation between those, however, the effect may include life-cycle savings due to
the differences in expected pension benefits. This is important particularly in terms
of policy implications. If households accumulate more wealth due to uncertainty,
policies for reducing uncertainty would reduce precautionary savings and stimulate
consumption, all other factors being equal. If households accumulate more assets for
life-cycle motives, however, policies should affect the expected pension benefits of
such households if those policies are to have any influence on consumption. 
To investigate this problem, the most direct approach is to test the correlation
between the public pension benefits expected by households and the reply regarding
public pension uncertainty. If households with higher public pension uncertainty
accumulate more wealth for life-cycle motives rather than precautionary motives, the
expected value of public pension benefits should be lower than that for those without
public pension uncertainty, all other factors being equal. Regrettably, however, such 
a question is not posed in the JPSC. Thus, we employ the target savings amount 
for retirement, which is available in the JPSC. If households with public pension
uncertainty accumulate more wealth for life-cycle motives, the expected target 
savings amount for retirement should be higher than that for households without
public pension uncertainty, all other factors being equal. We also regress the
wealth/income equation including the target savings amount to control possible
biases due to the correlation between the target savings amount and uncertainty over
public pension benefits. 
A. Data
The JPSC asks two types of questions concerning target savings amounts. One involves
target savings amounts by different objectives. The question consists of two stages.
First, savings objectives must be selected in “For what purposes do you and your spouse
accumulate wealth? Please select your primary objective, secondary objective, and the
third most important objective from among the following.” As examples of savings
objectives, 12 items are listed, including “for retired life,” “for unexpected expenses due
to sickness, disasters, and others,” “for children’s education,” “for children’s marriages,”
37
Precautionary Savings and Income Uncertainty: Evidence from Japanese Micro Data
Table 8  Equation Residuals by Economic Prospect
Better No change Worse
Number of Average Variance Number of Average Variance Number of Average Variance observations observations observations
eit (previous year) 123 –0.008 0.018 88 0.006 0.020 38 –0.035 0.013
eit+1 (this year) 123 –0.009 0.021 88 0.021 0.010 38 0.010 0.012
eit+2 (next year) 123 0.006 0.013 88 0.004 0.017 38 0.030 0.014
eit+3 (two years 123 0.010 0.022 88 0.007 0.010 38 0.008 0.023
in the future)
Note: This table reports the average and variance of equation residuals obtained from the earning
equation shown in Appendix Table 1. The observations are those for which equation residuals
are available for the second- to fifth-year panel, and for which a reply concerning economic
prospects is available.and “for housing loans.”
15 Then, for each of the three objectives selected, respondents
indicate the target amount and planned fulfillment year (how many years from now).
The other question simply asks the total target savings amount: “What is the total 
target savings you and your spouse are trying to achieve?” This may be problematic 
in the sense that savings objectives are not limited to life-cycle savings for life after
retirement, but can be employed as a reference measure, as more respondents provided
answers compared with the first question.
16
B. Uncertainty Concerning Public Pensions and Target Savings Amounts
Table 9 summarizes the above two target savings amounts for each reply concerning
public pensions.
17 The target savings amounts for those who selected reply 1 and 
those who selected replies 2 or 3 are similar in terms of both average and standard
deviation for “target savings amounts for retired life”; for nuclear families, the average
is somewhat higher. These findings are overall the same as for “total target savings
amounts.” Thus, no good argument can be made for those who selected replies 2 
or 3 having higher target savings amounts. In addition, the sum of the planned 
fulfillment time and husbands’ ages is found to be 59.7 years on average, implying
that households prepare to achieve their life-cycle savings by around age 60; this does
not differ among replies concerning public pension uncertainty. 
However, the above findings do not control factors other than uncertainty 
concerning public pensions, which may affect target savings amounts. The following
two models are thus estimated as the next step.
According to the life-cycle permanent-income theory, households’ target savings
amounts for retired life equal the expected assets held at the time of retirement.
Incorporating uncertainty, we obtain 
Wi* —– = h( i, Xi), (7)
Yi
p
where W * is the target savings amount for retired life. Thus, equation (3) is modified
as follows: 
Wi* —– = b0 + b11IDUM2i + b12IDUM3i + b13IDUM4i Yi
p
+ b2Yi
p + b3Fedui + b4Childreni + b5Agap + ηi. (8)
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15. The other motives are “for purchasing durable goods,” “for leisure activities,” “for paying taxes,” “for funds to
perform independent business operations,” “no particular reason but simply for peace of mind,” “for inheritance
to children,” and “others.”
16. In “savings for retired life,” target savings amounts are unavailable unless the objective is ranked third or higher as
a savings motive. Of the 718 married respondents who replied to the question concerning pensions, 335 of those
ranked “savings for retired life” third or higher (46.7 percent), while “target total savings amounts” are available
for 714 observations.
17. For “savings for retired life,” if no reply was obtained in the 1996 survey, target amounts are drawn from the
1995, 1994, or 1993 surveys (with available data from the year closest to 1996 being preferred). The results
remained the same when the samples were restricted to those in which replies were obtained in 1996 only.39
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Table 9  Target Savings Amounts and Uncertainty over Public Pensions
Response Target savings amount (¥ millions) to question Number of
concerning observations
uncertainty (subtotal) Average Standard Minimum Maximum
over pension deviation
1. All samples 
For retired life 1 66 11.89 12.19 2.00 60.00
2 186 11.74 10.90 1.00 70.00
3 189 11.79 13.21 0.50 100.00
4 36 18.03 24.76 1.00 100.00
(477)
Total target amount 1 90 24.56 23.35 1.00 100.00
currently planned 2 277 20.67 18.43 1.00 100.00
3 292 21.50 21.95 1.00 160.00
4 55 26.33 40.07 1.00 200.00
(714)
2. Nuclear families
For retired life 1 38 14.25 14.86 2.00 60.00
2 114 9.91 7.79 1.00 40.00
3 110 12.26 11.14 1.00 50.00
4 23 23.30 29.62 1.00 100.00
(285)
Total target amount 1 56 25.36 26.38 2.00 100.00
currently planned 2 181 18.55 17.00 1.00 100.00
3 191 21.83 21.67 1.00 105.00
4 37 31.35 47.21 1.00 200.00
(465)
3. Nuclear families 
(Samples used in 
Table 5)
For retired life 1 11 11.64 8.73 3.00 3.00
2 49 10.52 7.82 1.00 30.00
3 50 12.54 14.94 1.00 50.00
4 8 26.63 33.36 3.00 100.00
(118)
Total target amount 1 20 17.65 15.99 2.00 50.00
currently planned 2 83 19.08 16.68 1.00 90.00
3 92 18.75 18.20 1.00 105.00
4 13 34.46 48.86 3.00 170.00
(208)
Notes: 1. Item 1 covers all samples from which necessary data (target savings amounts or total 
targets, and responses to questions concerning uncertainty over pensions) can be obtained.
Item 2 indicates those not living with parents among 1; and item 3 represents samples used
for estimation of financial assets in Table 5, among those in 2. All exclude single households
and those in which husbands are farmers or self-employed.
2. For data on target savings amounts, if no reply was obtained in the 1996 survey, the target
amounts from the 1993, 1994, or 1995 survey are used (with available data from the year
closest to 1996 being preferred; 155 out of 477 samples). In addition, households with
extremely high target savings amounts (¥500 million or more; two samples for target savings
amounts and one sample for total targets) are excluded.If households with uncertainty concerning public pensions have a higher target
savings amount, b11 and b12 will be positive.
The second model is simply to add the target savings amount to equation (3).
Although the observation is reduced to half, by adding the target savings amount as
an explanatory variable, possible biases caused by the correlation between the
expected value and the uncertainty of public pension benefits can be controlled.
The results are given in Tables 10 and 11. Neither b11 nor b12 is significant at all
(Table 10). The third column of Table 11 demonstrates that adding the target savings
amount has little effect on the coefficients of public pension uncertainty dummies,
namely IDUM2 and IDUM3, for nuclear families. The effects are not statistically
different from those given in the second column of Table 5 [2]. These results indicate
that the positive effect of public pension uncertainty on wealth accumulation is due
to precautionary rather than life-cycle motives.
18
Another finding supporting the existence of precautionary savings is that uncer-
tainty for future public pension benefits increases deposits and/or personal insurance,
but not securities. As Kimball (1993) discussed, the theory of portfolio choice
demonstrates that uninsurable risk may induce prudent investors to reduce their
holdings of risky assets in order to lower their overall exposure to risk. Our empirical
results presented in Table 5 [2] are consistent with this argument.
Thus, from the two points concerning the target savings amount and the possession
of risk assets, no evidence is found to reject the existence of precautionary savings
caused by uncertainty over future public pension benefits.
VII. Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper to the literature on precautionary savings is 
testing of a theory using subjective or self-reported measures of uncertainty concern-
ing income, using micro data on Japanese households (primarily from those in 
their 30s). The longitudinal data are utilized in estimating earning functions for the
calculation of permanent income. The following conclusions have been reached.
First, nuclear-family households and households that do not receive income 
transfers from parents accumulate more wealth if they recognize public pension 
uncertainties. The effect is 30–40 percentage points in the financial-asset/permanent-
income ratio. On average, ¥1.5–2.1 million in financial assets (one-third or one-fourth
of the total financial assets held) is due to uncertainty regarding public pensions. As 
the respondents are primarily in their 30s, we find that households start to save due 
to uncertainty early in their lives, even if they will not start to receive their pension 
benefits at least until they become 60 years old. The effect may not totally exclude 
life-cycle savings; however, the acquired data have not confirmed any effects due to 
life-cycle motives. 
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18. It is assumed in this paper that the uncertainty over public pension benefits is independent of the rate of time
preference and the degree of risk aversion of households. The effects of public pension uncertainty dummies do
not alter when the planned fulfillment age (the sum of planned fulfillment time and husbands’ ages) is included
as an explanatory variable in equation (3), although the number of observations is reduced to 92.41
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Table 10  Uncertainty over Public Pension Benefits and Target Savings Amounts
All samples Nuclear families
For retired life Total amount  For retired life Total amount 
currently planned currently planned
IDUM2 –0.429 (0.605) –0.612 (0.796) –0.785 (0.698) –0.716 (0.978)
IDUM3 0.144 (0.684) –0.885 (0.792) –0.587 (0.768) –1.043 (0.964)
IDUM4 2.101 (1.273) 1.863 (1.863) 2.978 (1.742)* 3.410 (2.551)
Y
P –0.245 (0.115)** –0.318 (0.131)** –0.064 (0.094) –0.343 (0.159)**
Fedu 0.316 (0.138)** 0.591 (0.191)*** 0.290 (0.122)** 0.733 (0.207)***
Children 0.070 (0.268) –0.013 (0.431) –0.067 (0.255) 0.160 (0.504)
Agap 0.150 (0.108) 0.018 (0.079) –0.021 (0.069) –0.006 (0.083)
Constant –0.816 (2.000) –1.298 (2.41) –0.448 (1.677) –3.286 (2.613)
Number of  166 273 121 209 observations
Note: The estimation method is OLS. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance of independent variables, 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table 11  Effects of Uncertainty over Public Pension Benefits on Financial Assets,
Including Target Savings Amounts as an Explanatory Variable
All samples Nuclear families
For retired life Total amount  For retired life Total amount 
currently planned currently planned
IDUM2 0.116 (0.179) 0.242 (0.127)* 0.432 (0.168)** 0.426 (0.130)***
IDUM3 0.268 (0.200) 0.334 (0.139)** 0.506 (0.195)** 0.471 (0.141)***
IDUM4 0.295 (0.336) 0.205 (0.209) 0.759 (0.437)* 0.531 (0.269)**
Target savings 0.065 (0.037)* 0.076 (0.018)*** 0.078 (0.055) 0.073 (0.018)*** amount
Age –0.280 (0.219) –0.005 (0.118) –0.607 (0.261)** –0.145 (0.147)
Age
2 0.005 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.010 (0.004)*** 0.003 (0.002)
Y
P 0.005 (0.037) 0.026 (0.026) 0.001 (0.041) 0.039 (0.030)
Fedu 0.086 (0.041)** 0.075 (0.029)*** 0.090 (0.042)** 0.076 (0.032)**
Children –0.166 (0.085)* –0.112 (0.062)* –0.129 (0.095) –0.135 (0.069)*
Agap –0.072 (0.031)** –0.042 (0.019)** –0.066 (0.031)** –0.054 (0.020)***
Constant 3.505 (3.785) –1.463 (1.987) 8.273 (4.538)* 0.346 (2.429)
Number of  166 273 121 209 observations
Note: As in Table 5.Second, the finding that the effect of public pension uncertainty on savings 
is significant for nuclear families but not for extended families suggests that 
intergenerational risk-sharing reduces risk and therefore wealth accumulation. 
Third, precautionary savings due to public pension uncertainty are found to take
the form of relatively low-risk assets such as deposits and private personal insurance;
no precautionary savings are found in securities.
Finally, there is no evidence for precautionary savings when economic prospects
are utilized as the measure of labor income uncertainty. This is partly due to the fact
that the survey was conducted in 1994, when a considerable number of households
did not recognize a relationship between economic prospects and their own risk in
labor earnings. The result may differ if more recent data are applied (as well as data
acquired by directly asking individuals about their income risk).
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A. Estimation of Permanent Income
In accordance with King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982), the permanent income (defined
as normal age-adjusted annual earnings) is given by
lnyi
p = Zi  + ui − c(agei), (A.1)
where yi
p is the permanent income of individual i, Zi is the observable variable vector
(such as education and occupation),   is the associated coefficient vector, agei is 
his or her age in the sample year, and ui is the unobserved variable measurement 
characteristics such as skill, willingness, or luck constructed such that its mean value
in the population is zero and its variance is  u
2. The final term, c(agei), indicates a
cohort effect, which reflects the fact that younger generations are better off than their
elders due to technological progress and capital accumulation.
Current earnings differ from permanent income for two reasons. One is the
existence of an age-earnings profile over the life-cycle, and the other is the transitory
component of earnings. Therefore, current income in year t,  yit, is expressed as 
follows:
lnyit = lnyi
p + h(ageit − age —– ) + eit, (A.2)
where h measures the age-earnings profile. The transitory component of income,
denoted by eit (average = 0; variance =  e
2), is assumed to be uncorrelated with ui.
Combining equations (A.1) and (A.2) gives the following equation:
lnyit = Zi  + g(ageit) + ui + eit
g(ageit) = h(ageit − age —– ) − c(ageit). (A.3)
In equation (A.3), the age-earnings profile is assumed to be constant across the 
population. In applying this to Japan, we modify the equation to allow for different
age-earnings for each combination of education and the economic nature of an 
occupation (such as occupation, industry, and firm size). Hence, current earnings 
are expressed as
lnyit = Zi 1 + Zi 2ageit + Zi 3age
2
it + ui + eit. (A.4)
The third term is found to be insignificant in the estimation, and the permanent
income is computed for each household using  1,  2, and ui.
19
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19. The cohort effect is not accounted for, as the JPSC covers primarily households of those in their 30s. In King 
and Dicks-Mireaux (1982), permanent income at a certain age (45) is calculated by substituting equation 
(A.3) for equation (A.1). In this paper, permanent income is computed based on the years of estimation 
(1996 for pension uncertainty and 1994 for economic forecasts), to allow age-earnings profiles to vary among
education, occupation, and firm size.1. Estimation of equation (A.4)
The husband’s non-property disposable income is deflated by the household con-
sumption expenditure deflator. For Zi, the husband’s education as well as occupation,
firm size, and industry are incorporated.
20 As noted above, the third term in equation
(A.4) is first included, but is found to be insignificant and is therefore excluded from
the model (Appendix Table 1, to be explained below).
2. Calculation of permanent income
a. Husband’s income
Husbands are assumed to retire at the age of 60. Income up to the age of 50 is 
computed using the parameters obtained from the regression. Income from the age of
51 to 60 is calculated by applying another source of data, assuming that the ratios of
incomes and wages are equal. More precisely, income up to the age of 60 is calculated
by the following equation.
wj,age yi,age = ——yi,50,   j: group by firm size and education,   j = 1 ,  ...,  20,  wj,50
(A.5)
where wj indicates the annual wage classified by the education level and company 
size of households’ heads, drawn from the 1993 Basic Survey on Wage Structure
conducted by the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and
Telecommunications.
21 The husband’s permanent income is then computed as
1     
61 –age –N yi,age+n yi
p = —————      ———,   N : Working years at present.  (A.6)
61–age –N n =−N (1 + r)
n
b. Wife’s income
It is assumed that wives working part-time continue to work at the same wage until
the age of 54,
22 and that housewives maintain their current status.
Appendix Table 1 gives the regression results. Both the random-effect model and
the fixed-effect model are applied, and the fixed-effect model is supported by the
Hausman test. This indicates that labor earnings (of male employees) are affected by
unobservable factors, and that panel data are useful in estimating the model. The age
effect (including growth effects) is found to be 2.5 percent for clerical workers in
small enterprises (fewer than 10 employees) who have graduated from junior high
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20. As the JPSC requests the disclosure of annual incomes in the previous year, the explanatory variables are replaced
by those obtained in the previous year. For the first year of the panel (1993), those other than age are assumed to
be the same in 1992 and 1993. Data for years in which job transfers or losses occur are eliminated (108 samples
and one sample, respectively). Even if these samples are not excluded and the job-transfer dummy and job-loss
dummy are added to the explanatory variables, the central empirical results do not change.
21. The Basic Survey on Wage Structure does not include enterprises having fewer than 10 workers. Thus, for house-
holds in which the husband works for such small enterprises, it is assumed that Wj,age/Wj,50 = 1 (leveling off at 50).
Note that retirement allowances are not included.
22. This refers to the fact that the part-time-employment ratios (employment of fewer than 35 hours per week) of
married women fall by half after 55 years of age; the ratios are 15.4 percent for those aged 23–34, 22.3 percent
for those aged 35–44, 20.2 percent for those aged 45–54, 10.9 percent for those aged 55–64, and 3.5 percent for
those aged 65 or older, according to the Report on the Special Survey on the Labor Force Survey, February 1993
conducted by the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications.45
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Appendix Table 1  Estimated Earnings Functions for the Calculation 
of Permanent Income
Fixed effect Random effect
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
Husband’s age (age) 0.022 (0.011)** 0.013 (0.007)*
Husband’s education
Senior high school graduate — — –0.132 (0.182)
Technical/junior college graduate — — –0.397 (0.236)*
University/graduate school graduate — — –0.131 (0.216)
Husband’s education × age
Senior high school graduate × age 0.011 (0.010) 0.007 (0.005)
Technical/junior college graduate × age 0.010 (0.012) 0.015 (0.007)
University/graduate school graduate × age 0.011 (0.010) 0.011 (0.006)**
Size of husband’s employer
10–99 workers –0.169 (0.164) –0.127 (0.133)
100–999 workers –0.393 (0.192)** –0.292 (0.150)*
1,000 or more workers –0.456 (0.217)** –0.403 (0.170)**
Public office –0.365 (0.347) –0.510 (0.256)**
Size of husbands employer × age
10–99 workers × age 0.005 (0.005) 0.004 (0.004)
100–999 workers × age 0.011 (0.006)** 0.010 (0.004)**
1,000 or more workers × age 0.014 (0.006)** 0.016 (0.005)***
Public office × age 0.021 (0.010)** 0.020 (0.007)***
Husband’s occupation
Management/professional –0.169 (0.247) –0.005 (0.215)
Technical/educational –0.130 (0.167) –0.062 (0.140)
Skilled worker –0.093 (0.157) 0.092 (0.130)
Service –0.092 (0.179) –0.050 (0.154)
Husbands occupation × age
Management/professional × age 0.004 (0.007) 0.001 (0.006)
Technical/educational × age 0.003 (0.005) 0.001 (0.004)
Skilled worker × age 0.001 (0.004) –0.004 (0.004)
Service × age 0.002 (0.005) 0.001 (0.004)
Husband’s employer’s business category
Agricultural/fishery/marine/mining –1.019 (0.902) –0.831 (0.648)
Construction 0.118 (0.239) 0.248 (0.160)
Wholesale/retail 0.374 (0.212)* 0.289 (0.160)*
Financial/insurance/real estate 0.140 (0.309) 0.188 (0.226)
Transportation/communication 0.477 (0.267)* 0.441 (0.195)**
Electricity/gas/water supply 0.040 (0.447) 0.052 (0.331)
Service 0.385 (0.205)* 0.304 (0.153)**
Husband’s employer’s business category × age
Agricultural/fishery/marine/mining × age 0.033 (0.027) 0.026 (0.019)
Construction × age –0.002 (0.007) –0.006 (0.005)
Wholesale/retail × age –0.009 (0.006) –0.008 (0.005)*
Financial/insurance/real estate × age 0.001 (0.009) 0.000 (0.007)
Transportation/communication × age –0.012 (0.007) –0.011 (0.006)**
Electricity/gas/water supply × age 0.002 (0.012) 0.002 (0.010)
Service × age –0.009 (0.006)* –0.008 (0.004)*
Constant 4.929 (0.229)*** 5.357 (0.240)***
Number of observations 2,434 2,434





Notes: 1. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance of independent
variables, at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
2. In the fixed-effect model, the F-test for all ui = 0 is F(681, 1,728) = 5.46 (p-value = 0.0000). In the random-
effect model, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test is  2(2) = 949.87 (p-value = 0.0000) and
the Hausman specification test is  2(34) = 115.13 (p-value = 0.0000).
3. For the education dummy, the standard is junior high school graduate; for the husband’s job category, the
standard is clerical work; for the size of the husband’s employer, the standard is small-scale (1–9); and for
the husband’s employer’s business category, the standard is manufacturing.school. This is reasonable, considering that the average growth rate of earnings for
the covered period (1993–98) is 0.2 percent, and that the age effect calculated from
the wages of junior high graduates working for small enterprises (10–99 workers)
from 20–24 to 45–49 years of age, as specified in the Basic Survey on Wage Structure,
is 2.2 percent (for 1993).
23 Furthermore, the cross-effects of age and higher education
or those of age and larger enterprises tend to be positive, which is also consistent with
the characteristics obtained from other statistics on Japanese employees.
In computing permanent income, the discount rate is assumed to be 0.0286,
which is derived from 2.76 percent (the rate for long-term government bonds 
[10 years] in 1996) minus –0.1 percent (the household consumption expenditure
deflator).
24 For the income of wives with part-time jobs and that of husbands from 50
to 60 years of age, the growth rate is assumed to equal the discount rate. Applying
these rates, the average permanent income in 1996 is calculated as ¥5.02 million
(standard deviation of ¥1.68 million; 417 observations).
B. Income Data and Sample Selection
1. Sample selection
(1) Farm and self-employed workers as well as family workers are excluded due 
to the fact that their permanent incomes are difficult to estimate. For the 
same reason, employees with additional business earnings are also excluded.
Households in which husbands are students are excluded as well.
(2) Households in which husbands are 51 years of age or older are excluded, due
to a limited number of observations.
(3) Households in which wives work full-time are excluded. This is due to the 
fact that the lifetime earnings of married women working full-time vary 
substantially and are difficult to estimate in Japan; some of them continue to
work as men normally do, some retire after having children, and some start
working again as their children grow up.
(4) Households in which wives work part-time and their income exceeds ¥1 million
are excluded. This is due to the fact that wives’ annual earnings amounting to
¥1 million or less will not affect husbands’ tax exemptions, nor will income
taxes or residential taxes be levied on the wives’ earnings.
(5) Households in which husbands or wives perform piecework at home are
excluded.
As a result, the remaining households are those in which husbands are aged 50 years
or younger and are employed, and wives either work part-time and earn ¥1 million
or less per year or have no jobs.
2. Income data
As the JPSC asks questions concerning the payment of taxes and social security 
insurance as well as income, non-property disposable income can be calculated 
as follows:
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23. The annual earnings for 1993 (including bonuses) were calculated from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure for
1993 and 1994.
24. Discount rates of 1 percent or 2 percent are also applied, and do not change the main implications obtained in
Section V.Husband’s income (non-property disposable income)
= earnings from husband’s employer + husband’s social security benefits 
– husband’s tax/social security payments.
Wife’s income (non-property disposable income)
= earnings from wife’s employer + wife’s social security benefits 
– wife’s tax/social security payments.
It is found that in more than 80 percent of households, husbands receive no social
security benefits; among those who receive such benefits, it is observed that the
allowance for dependent children (¥5,000 each, ¥10,000 each from the third child,
both per month) is a major source. More precisely, the number of households that
receive social security benefits is 580 out of 2,622 observations. Among the 580
observations, 275 households receive ¥60,000 annually, while 70 households receive
¥12,000. Households that receive more than ¥24,000 account for only 1.4 percent.
These findings suggest that the social security benefits received by such households
are due primarily to the allowance for dependent children, which will terminate
when children reach six years of age. Thus, social security benefits are calculated as
zero except for households for which social security benefits are apparently classified
as an unemployment allowance (21 observations). As for social security benefits 
for wives, the ratio of households in which wives receive such benefits is less than 
10 percent. Thus, social security benefits are assumed to be zero, as it is not clear
whether wives will work again in the future.
For respondents from which annually based replies are not obtained concerning
tax/social security payments, they are calculated in accordance with the following
procedure:
25 the tax allowances and social insurance premiums are calculated from
annual incomes to determine taxable incomes, which are then multiplied by the 
corresponding tax rates (income and residential taxes) to calculate incomes.
Income (= non-property disposable income) = taxable income × (1 – tax rate).
Taxable income = annual earnings – tax allowance – social insurance premiums.
Tax allowance = exemption for spouse + special exemption for spouse 
+ allowance for dependent 
= ¥380,000 × (2 + number of children).
Social insurance premiums = social insurance premium ratio × annual 
earnings for previous year × (1 – bonus ratio 
for previous year).
Bonus ratio = bonus/annual earnings.
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25. In the JPSC, annual incomes for the previous year are surveyed; tax/social security payments are taken from
either the annual payments for the previous year or those paid in September of the current year (integrated into
the former from the 1999 survey). Thus, for households responding with the latter payment data and those that
did not specify tax/social security payments, disposable incomes are calculated in accordance with the procedures
explained here.As for tax rates, based on the taxable-income figures obtained above, they are 
determined through the application of corresponding income tax rates (0.1–0.5) and
residential tax rates (0.05–0.15). Note that social security insurance premiums are
calculated in accordance with standard monthly remuneration, which does not take
bonuses into account. As bonuses are not covered by the JPSC, bonus ratios for male
workers are investigated using the Basic Survey on Wage Structure. As it is found 
that the ratio apparently varies depending on firm size, the ratio is assumed to be
0.26 for enterprises employing 1,000 or more workers, 0.22 for those employing 100
or more but fewer than 1,000, 0.17 for those employing 10 or more but fewer than
100, and 0.14 for those employing fewer than 10. For public officials, the ratio is
determined as 0.25. The social security insurance premium ratio is determined 
for each household by referring to the table matching the amount of standard
monthly remuneration and annual earnings without the bonus obtained above.
26 For
employment insurance, the ratio is 0.006 (0.007 for construction industries). The
ratio of tax/social security payments to annual income, acquired from the above, is a
maximum of 59.1 percent (covering the 2,917 households from which the data
required for calculation could be obtained). On the other hand, as there are few
households in which the ratios exceeded 0.6 (11 samples among 1,255) in the data
indicated by household, they are excluded from the sample.
APPENDIX 2: WEALTH DATA
A. Financial Wealth
The JPSC requests specification of the amount of financial assets of three types,
proposing the following as examples:
1. Deposits
Includes fixed-rate deposits, term deposits, installment savings, and ordinary savings
at post offices; term deposits, installment savings, and ordinary deposits at banks and
credit associations (such as shinkin banks); deposits at companies, gold investment
accounts, gold savings accounts, medium-term government securities funds, etc.
2. Securities
Includes stocks (market value), debentures (face value), stock investment trusts 
(market value), bond investment trusts (market value), loan trusts/money trusts 
(face value).
3. Personal insurance and others
Includes postal insurance, postal annuity pensions, life insurance, personal pension
insurance, reserve-type liability insurance, educational insurance, etc.
Concerning insurance, the JSPC requests specification of the amount of any 
premiums paid in the previous year, together with the total premium amount paid in
past years if the insurance is not term insurance but offers a maturity refund. Thus,
the following definition has been adopted for financial assets:
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26. To simplify calculations, for households to which the first and highest grades of the standard monthly remunera-
tion are not applied, the figures acquired from the conversion of annual incomes excluding bonuses to a monthly
basis are determined as the standard monthly remuneration.Financial assets
= deposits + securities held + total paid-up amounts for savings-type 
insurance policies.
To determine the total paid-up insurance premiums, the saved-up portions should
be subtracted and evaluated at the present values. However, as the paid-up amounts
for each year are not available, the total paid-up amounts are used.
B. Physical Assets
The JPSC asks questions concerning residences currently occupied, specifically 
(1) whether they are owned by the respondents; (2) the market values of land and
residences (among those who own their houses); and (3) under whose names they are
registered (husband, wife, common property of husband and wife, common property
with a parent, husband’s parent, or wife’s parent). As for liabilities, any housing or
other loans (housing loans, automobile loans, consumer loans, cash advances, etc.)
are determined. Based on that information, total net worth is defined as follows:
Total net worth = financial assets + present market values of privately owned
land and residences – outstanding liabilities.
If privately owned residences are registered under parents’ names, the physical
assets are set at zero. Cases in which the owners of the residences are registered in
common with the parents are excluded from the samples, as the ownership ratios are
not available in the JPSC. In the case of rented residences, the physical assets are also
set at zero. 
APPENDIX 3: FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE UNCERTAINTY
Prior to the estimation of wealth/income regressions, probit estimations are 
conducted to examine possible factors affecting both wealth accumulation and
prospects concerning business conditions or uncertainty over pubic pensions. For
economic prospects, ordered probit estimations are employed using dummies such as
“conditions will be better (much better + slightly better)” = 1, “no change” = 2, and
“worse (much worse + slightly worse)” = 3. For uncertainty over public pensions,
regressions are formulated in two steps. First, probit estimation is conducted in
which those who have selected reply 4 are denoted as one and the others as zero. In
the second step, ordered-probit estimation is conducted for those who did not select
reply 4, with “relying” (reply 1) = 1, “worried about reductions” (reply 2) = 2, and
“worried about the system itself” (reply 3) = 3.
27
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27. If the ordered probit estimations are conducted only for those who selected replies 1, 2, or 3, with those 
who selected reply 4 excluded, the results may be biased due to sample selection problems. Thus, prior to this
estimation, for all samples, for (1) those who selected replies 1, 2, or 3 and (2) those who selected replies 2 or 3
among those who selected replies 1, 2, or 3, Heckman’s maximum-likelihood probit estimation with selection
was conducted. The results indicate that the sample selections are not significant (p = 0.2809).Examining the results presented in Appendix Table 2, it can be seen that the lower
the level of wives’ education, the lower the income, and that those in double-income
households tend to have more pessimistic prospects. As for reliance on public 
pensions, households with fewer children tend to rely less on such pensions. The 
reasons for this remain to be determined, but considering that the number of 
children is an endogenous variable, reverse-causal relationships may be a plausible
explanation (as children are less likely to care for parents in their old age, those 
relying on pensions tend to have more children; however, those who do not rely 
on pensions tend to have fewer children).
28 The younger the husband, the higher 
the wives’ education levels, and the fewer the children, the more uncertainty there
tends to be concerning pensions. One important finding is that the husbands’ age 
has a negative effect. The younger the husband, the longer the period until he 
starts receiving his pension benefits in the future, which intensifies his uncertainty
concerning public pensions, as does the aging of Japanese society.
Based on the above estimation results, the wife’s education, number of children,
double-income dummy, and current income are added to the regression, including the
economic-prospect dummy; the wife’s education, number of children, and the age 
difference between husband and wife are incorporated into the equation concerning
uncertainty over public pensions.
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Appendix Table 2  Factors Affecting Economic Prospects and Uncertainty 
over Public Pension Benefits
Economic prospects




Husband’s age 0.017 (0.011) –0.015 (0.022) –0.027 (0.014)**
Wife’s age 0.030 (0.019) 0.020 (0.032) 0.037 (0.021)*
Wife’s education –0.052 (0.025)** –0.092 (0.049)* 0.066 (0.031)**
Double-income dummy 0.252 (0.084)*** –0.101 (0.147) –0.014 (0.093)
Annual income –0.355 (0.135)*** –0.164 (0.216) –0.194 (0.140)
Number of children 0.085 (0.049)* –0.222 (0.084)*** –0.107 (0.054)**
Extended-family dummy –0.013 (0.100) 0.128 (0.175) 0.008 (0.112)
Owner-occupier dummy 0.050 (0.095) 0.177 (0.169) –0.011 (0.109)
Constant — 0.951 (1.433) —
Number of observations 728 736 678
Log likelihood –798.99 –195.24 –667.21
Notes: 1. Ordered probit estimation on answers concerning economic prospects.
2. Probit estimation on answers concerning public pension uncertainty; 1 for households that
selected reply 4 and 0 for others (that selected reply 1, 2, or 3).
3. Ordered probit estimation among those who answered 1, 2, or 3 for public pension benefits.
4. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the
statistical significance of independent variables, at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.
28. However, considering that the targets of our survey are primarily young females, some households expect to have
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